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 The author is of the opinion that with the fall of the Berlin wall not all 
obstacles to the free circulation of goods and people were eliminated — either 
in Europe or in other regions of the world, since there are numerous other 
walls standing in the way of establishing a global world or European order.  
 In that context, the agreement among the members of the European 
Union on the all-out control of “its borders” towards the non-member 
European countries, is considered by the author as a specific form of a new 
“curtain”, not “iron” any longer, but electronic. Its function, the author claims, 
is to divide Europe into the Union and the Non-union, which is in many 
ways harmful for the promotion of the European idea — in the spiritual and 
the material sense. 
 
 In the post-war political history, the schism between the totalitarian 
eastern world and the democratic world of the West is exemplified with 
the term “iron curtain”. Though this term at first glance carries an une-
quivocal symbolism, it was a screen which hid a plethora of undertakings, 
whose consequences the population living in that “iron” belt still feels 
(and will probably go on feeling for a long time).  
 In the world there have been some examples of self-imposed autarchic 
development, but never on such a systematic and broad scale. More nu-
merous are the examples of imposed autarchy, as a specific form of pres-
sure on certain states in order to bring them to heel or induce them to 
a desirable behavior.  
 In Europe, another symbol similar to that of the “iron curtain” is the 
“Berlin wall”, whose fall — or demolition — and the recently signed 
agreement on cooperation and partnership between NATO and Russia, 
leads us to the conclusion that the days of the divided Europe are over; 
at least that is what numerous international factors (who, by he way, very 
facilely determine the fate of small nations) have been trying to convince 
us of. 
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 However, facts do not corroborate this conclusion since there are many 
small walls scattered around Europe and the world. Some of them are 
disappearing, but others are being erected, along different lines. For ex-
ample, along its Mexican border, Americans have installed a “sensor wall”, 
in combination with meshed wire; in Europe, on the other hand, there 
was first the “treaty wall” and now the “Schengen wall”, with which some 
countries are electronically and administratively fencing themselves off from 
other parts of Europe. 
 Not all walls are the same. Some serve economic interests, others mi-
gratory, still others security, so it is extremely difficult to compare them. 
Thus, only the “walls” with the identical function and purpose may be 
juxtaposed.  
 If this criterion is applied, certain similarities may be discerned; thus, 
there are analogies between the “Berlin wall” and the “Schengen wall”. 
The first was protecting the “idyllic world of socialism” from the contagion 
of the “rotten capitalism”, while the other is protecting the European 
West from the “viral European East”, burdened with numerous post-com-
munist traumas, which should consequently be systematically decontaminated 
and — over a longer or a shorter period of time — made fit for a 
standard communication.  
 There are also differences between the “Berlin” and the “Schengen” 
walls. The first was put up at the boundary between two different political 
and economic systems and its goal was to disrupt any communication. The 
other has no such purpose. It is unilateral in its function. It obstructs 
with all possible administrative and electronic means the imission of 
undesirable social-viral phenomena and insists on the emission of Western 
values, regardless of the cost and the repercussions.  
 Thus one can argue that the implementation of the Schengen Agree-
ment has put up a new curtain, which is not iron but electronic, at the 
periphery of the Union.  
 The need for such an “electronic curtain” has two sources. It was set 
up because of the elimination of customs barriers and control between the 
Union member states on the one hand and the third countries on the 
other, and because of the shift of the control to the peripheral regions of 
the Union. Later, security reasons were added to its rationale, as well as 
the provisions from the agreement on the European Union (Maastricht 
1992) and the part which refers to the joint defense and security. That is 
why the “Schengen wall” is formally based on the Schengen Agreement of 
1985, but practically on numerous additional agreements, which is the rea-
son it was put into effect only ten years later (in 1995) and that even 
nowadays some member countries resist its implementation or seek a spe-
cial treatment for themselves.  
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 The central part of the Schengen Agreement (named after a small 
place in Luxembourg where it was signed) is the transfer of the customs 
control for all Union members to its peripheral states, thus abolishing in-
terior controls (apart from entry points like airports) and immensely ad-
vancing the traffic; however, at the same time, the control at the periph-
ery is stepped up (by means of the networked police control) and subjects 
from the third countries are discriminated against because they are treated 
in a different way.  
 This Agreement has been put into practice by most member countries. 
Some members claim that they do not have the appropriate computer 
equipment, while Great Britain and Ireland, and to some extent Denmark, 
seek for themselves a special status. Austria began implementing certain 
provisions of the Agreement in early 1996. Italy is planning to do the 
same in the near future, while in the Greek parliament this Agreement is 
undergoing the ratification procedure. Slovenia is also thinking about in-
troducing some elements of the Agreement, though it is only an associate 
member, which brings the Schengen issue to the Croatian borders. 
 Nevertheless, with or without the Agreement, the European Union has 
an elaborate system of regulated cooperation with many states, in their vi-
cinity or further afield. These include agreements on cooperation and eco-
nomic relations which have in the last few years included the provisions 
referring to the security and the universally desirable developments 
(particularly so in the case of the so called “European agreements”); thus, 
they may also be considered a sort of a wall which cannot be climbed 
over. Significantly, these agreements are called European, which proves 
that they are something more than a usual cooperation: an acceptance of 
certain European values, as defined by the Union; their violation is sanc-
tioned by many expedients, including (ultimately) suspension.  
 In the case of Croatia, this wall can be identified in the form of the 
Union’s regional approach by means of which the Union has been giving 
support to a new integration of the Balkan regions, envisaging for Croatia 
a different role from the one it has had.  
 Only this could explain the Union’s regional approach which is trying 
to link something unlinkable. If such links had been possible, they would 
not have broken apart; if there was no desire to push Croatia into such 
“partnerships”, it would not be held in the stand-by, “checkmate”, qualified 
position of a forced cooperation with some states of the former 
Yugoslavia as a prerequisite for Croatia’s cooperation with the Union. 
 Although the Union has been trying to convince Croatian diplomacy 
that, in case of Croatia’s acceptable behavior (meaning toeing the Union’s 
line to the letter) it will sign a special agreement based on the same 
basket of policies, a bitter taste of coercion remains nevertheless. President 
Tudjman is right when he resists such politics and thus once again proves 
that his vision of the Croatian state interests is broader than the 
 
Mileta V., Is a new “Iron Curtain”..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIV, (1997), No. 5, pp. 88—93 91 
                                                                                                                                              
opposition’s, who do not perceive any stratagem in the Union’s policy 
towards Croatia. 
 And the stratagem is cunning. First, the Union has placed Croatia on 
the other side of the wall being erected in southeast Europe. Second, they 
want to force Croatia to adapt its economic development to its 
southeastern surroundings and thus serve as a shock-absorber for the pres-
sures of the undeveloped Europe on its developed regions (i.e. the terri-
tory of the Union). And third, this is an attempt to thwart Croatia’s de-
sire to (in time) form an economic association and close political ties with 
its northern neighbors. Herein the Union’s special Balkan policy and its 
support for (even imposition of) “the Balkan cooperation” of the new 
states, in the guise of the so called “regional approach”. 
 The Union exercises special policies towards other European regions, 
though with different motivation. Thus we can distinguish among the cen-
tral European policy (for the CEFTA states), the Mediterranean policy (as 
implemented via the Euro-Mediterranean forum), the Asian policy (also 
implemented via a special forum), the Latin-American policy, the ACP 
policy (the associated member states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pa-
cific) and, lastly, a special policy for Russia which is, regardless of its 
transitional hardships, a major economic and political factor for the Union. 
 All these policies have “shock absorbers” built into them, in case cer-
tain undesirable behavior occurs; they may also be considered small walls. 
One could well imagine what would happen in the Union if these absorb-
ers did not exist and the enormity of the flow of workers from eastern 
Europe that would swamp the economic centers of Europe.  
 That is why the celebrations which accompanied the fall of the Berlin 
wall as an end to the divided Europe were rather premature. It is also 
premature to interpret the latest NATO-Russian friendship in this light, 
because the wall’s structure has remained intact, only the plaster has 
peeled off.  
 It is true that the wall got moved farther to the northeast and south-
east of Europe and that the “construction work” is now being done more 
subtly; those left beyond it are even assured that the wall is in their in-
terest and to their advantage.  
 These developments may be noticed through an analysis of the Union’s 
policy towards the non-Union regions. In the field of economic coopera-
tion and trade relations they are noticeable in the types of agreements 
that the Union concludes with the third countries since they serve as a 
gauge of the Union’s interest for individual states or regions. 
 In its relations with the third countries, the Union uses the following 
types of agreements: the customs union agreements (Turkey, Malta, Cy-
prus); free trade agreements (exclusive agreements with the EFTA coun-
tries which were later rearranged into a separate agreement on the EEA 
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region); the European agreements (basically the agreements on associated 
membership) — the change of the name is due to the fact that some 
new elements have been added, especially from the sphere of human and 
minority rights; the preferential agreements for the ACP and the Mediter-
ranean states; the agreements on trade and economic cooperation with 
Latin American states and the ASEAN countries; and the special sector 
agreements for the Third World countries. 
 In the palette of the mentioned contracts, the biggest barriers are faced 
by the countries with which the Union concludes agreements on trade and 
economic cooperation. A somewhat more benign regime is for the 
signatories of the European contracts (the associated membership 
agreements). The economically most favourable agreements are those of 
the customs union.  
 For Croatia the priority is a European agreement (on associated mem-
bership), much coveted by Croatia, but rather unlikely, since the Union 
has been pushing Croatia towards the agreement on trade and 
cooperation. 
 A state aspiring to a European agreement must prove that its legal in-
frastructure has been adapted to the needs of market economy. Next, it 
has to set a timetable for the adoption of the fundamental provisions of 
the Maastricht Agreement — in other words, the plan for accommodating 
social institutions to the solutions which are valid in the Union. Next, it 
must pledge to accept the adjudications of the European Court. It must 
bolster its cooperation with the neighboring countries and the third states. 
It must support the development of private business in various fields. It 
must participate in the project of trans-European networks, provide trade 
concessions to the Union members and the third states and adopt appro-
priate measures for the free movement of labour. 
 The associated status has two “pillar” agreements. One refers to the 
trade cooperation between a country and the Union — to economic rela-
tions in general. The other regulates numerous extra-economic issues 
(particularly the political cooperation and the political dialogue), which are 
instrumental in the pan-European integrations and in line with the Hel-
sinki Declaration and the Paris Charter. 
 The associated status implies that, as a rule, the implementation of the 
agreed upon provisions in the area of economy is limited to a ten-year 
period. After the first five years, the effects of the provisions are analyzed 
and, if deemed positive, the second phase commences. 
 The associated membership agreement gradually eliminates customs du-
ties and other restrictions — with an uneven dynamics. Usually, an associ-
ated member state is given a longer grace period for lowering tariffs for 
the goods imported from the Union. For example, Poland was given a 
unilateral two-year grace period, so that it began to lower its tariffs for 
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the import of “European goods” in 1994, and the eventual elimination of 
the tariffs is to happen in 1999. The same dynamics is valid for other 
restrictions. 
 This means that the associated status has its wall, too. In order to 
climb over it, many requirements ought to be met, and when they are, 
the political will of the Union members — the key to the door — is 
needed. 
 And finally, the road to the Schengen wall is paved with numerous 
misunderstandings. First, in June of 1994, the European Union Council 
adopted the principles of abolishing customs and police formalities on the 
borders between the member countries. After that, France and Germany 
made an agreement on the abolition of border control, which is usually 
considered the first step in the implementation of the mentioned principles 
(the Saarbrucken Agreement). Then came the Schengen Agreement, among 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Holland. These states signed 
an additional agreement in 1990 about the conditions and the guarantees 
for the implementation of the Schengen Agreement (it contains 142 
articles and must be ratified by the national parliaments). Other Union 
members tuned in. Italy did that in November of 1990 (but has not 
implemented it yet), Spain and Portugal in 1991, Austria in 1995 (partly 
implemented as of 1996). Greece also joined in 1991, but the process of 
ratification is only now under way. Great Britain was allowed to control 
its own borders (due to its status of an island country). Ireland aspires to 
this status as well, while the Scandinavian countries, members of the Un-
ion, do not conceal their intention to retain their special status.  
 It is worth noting that the “Schengen wall” does not stop short at 
border controls. It involves the police data network of national security 
services, which each member state will be able to access by means of 
special on-line terminals and store in them the information, in compliance 
with the signed agreements. Practically it means that a system of control 
with millions of data is to be set up, which can easily turn into a system 
of abuse unprecedented in the world history. 
 Thus, the answer to the question is a new “iron curtain” reemerging is 
negative; however, the process of creating “the electronic curtain”, running 
counter to the parallel process of utmost liberalization within the Union, 
has undoubtedly begun. A rift has opened in Europe between the Union 
and the Non-Union; the Non-Union countries are shooed away and into 
special associations, allegedly according to a certain regional geographical 
criterion, though the truth is somewhat different as can be clearly seen in 
the case of Croatia. 
 
